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Abstract
We suggest a model of electoral competition between two parties which is extended
by a third player: mass media. The classical one-dimensional competition model is
changed by introducing an issue-specific sensibility-coefficient and by allowing for
non-voting. The winner is selected by majority rule. The voter potentials of the par-
ties are determined by their current policy choice. Deviating from (exogenous) tra-
ditional party policy reduces the credibility of a party in the eyes of potential voters.
The number of non-voters increases with the sensibility of individuals to the issue
and with the deviation distance. By reporting with political bias, mass media has
selective influence on the sensibility-coefficient of potential voters of both parties.
They get either desensitised or over-sensitised in respect to party credibility which
alters the number of non-voters. Parties being able to successfully communicate with
mass media can manage to turn an unfavourable situation before election cam-
paigning into an electoral victory.
Non-technical summary
It is commonly accepted that mass media influences the outcome of elections. Cer-
tainly, the electoral victories of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair were partly based on
successful communication with mass media. The objective of this paper is to analyse
whether and under which conditions mass media is able to decide upon the winner
of an election. Public choice theory is dealing with the issue of electoral outcomes.
In this paper we suggest a model that incorporates mass media as an actor on the
political scene. We look at two parties competing for victory in elections. Mass me-
dia is devised in two parts each favouring one of the political parties. Further we as-
sume that it is important for voters that the parties they want to elect are credible. In
the model credibility is reduced if parties deviate from the political positions that
they are traditionally known for. If they lose credibility some of the potential voters
get disappointed and do not cast their votes. Credibility loss creates a high number
of non-voters if the topics of the election are very important for the individuals (e.g.
security, employment etc.), i.e. the intrinsic sensibility of the voters towards these
topics is very high. This sensibility is the edge in which mass media influence comes
in. We assume that the individuals’ sensibility is correlated with the intensity of re-
porting about important political issues. If mass media reports independently and
consumer oriented it will meet the information demand of the individuals. However,
media is supposed to have political interests as well. By reporting with lower/higher
intensity about credibility losses of parties mass media is able to decrease/increase
the number of disappointed non-voters. We suppose that parties take this reporting
bias into account when deciding on their political platform.
We found that under these assumptions a party has the more a favourable pre-
electoral position the closer its traditional policy is to the political middle. However,
if the traditional positions are not too extreme and if sensibility is not too high, mass
media is able to make a winner even out of an unfavourable pre-electoral position.
This, however, requires a good relationship between the pre-electoral loser and its
affiliated part of mass media.
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11 Introduction
It is commonly accepted that mass media is an important player in the political land-
scape. Nevertheless, there is only little literature on the influence of media in public
choice especially in respect to models of electoral competition. JENÖFFY-
LOCHAU (1997) tries to build a spatial model based on the work of CHAPPELL and
KEECH (1986). He emphasises the power of mass media to change voters’ prefer-
ences and formulates hypotheses on that issue. Media as actor, however, is not ex-
plicitly modelled. This study tries to fill this gap assuming that mass media is able to
mobilise or demobilise potential voters under constant preferences.
Although mass media has been dealt with only to little extends in public choice lit-
erature there are some directions in research that touch the issue. There is quite a bit
of literature on political propaganda, political advertising, and campaigning most of
which is either dealing with aspects of rent-seeking by interest-groups and/or with
reduction of voter uncertainty in probabilistic voting models.1 GERSBACH (1997: 6)
distinguishes service-induced and position-induced approaches to modelling cam-
paign contributions. The first focuses on the aspect that donators want to receive
services from the winning candidate while the second deals with improving the
electoral prospects of a favoured candidate/party. This study can be associated with
the latter in a deterministic-voting approach. Similar to URSPRUNG (1994) the aspect
of how information is perceived by the individual is comparably prominent in this
study. In contrast to this paper, we explicitly model mass media as market oriented
information distributor trying to support the candidate/party it is historically dedi-
cated to.2
In a two party electoral competition model we introduce mass media as an actor
who, by maximising his utility, is taking direct influence on individuals’ utility and
indirectly on policy choice of the parties. Therefore, we introduce an issue specific
sensibility-coefficient for individuals which can be influenced by mass media. The
value of the coefficient partly decides upon how many voters have a positive utility
                                          
1 E.g. JENÖFFY-LOCHAU (1997), MUELLER and STRATMANN (1994), AUSTEN-SMITH (1987),
CONGLETON (1986 and 1989), MORTON and CAMERON (1992), CLARK and THOMAS (1995).
2 Similar to the assumption that parties have a record mass media blocks are supposed to have a
party specific record as well.
2and thus cast their votes. The other determinant of an individual’s utility is the de-
viation of the parties from their record. Both sensibility and record are exogenous.
The paper is organised as follows. First we introduce the basic model by describing
the individual’s choice considering party credibility and deduce the policy choice of
the parties (Chapter 2). Based on that model we will introduce mass media with its
utility functions and control variables as a player in the strategic electoral competi-
tion model (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4 we analyse if and under which conditions mass
media is able to turn a party’s unfavourable pre-electoral situation into a victory.
Chapter 5 summarises the basic results and gives an outlook for further work.
2 General framework
The analytical framework introduces considerable changes to the DOWNSIAN one-
dimensional (one issue) policy model (Downs 1957). The most significant changes
are that we allow for non-voting and introduce an issue-specific sensibility-
coefficient. The winner out of two parties is selected by majority voting. The elec-
tion game is characterised by the following sequence of actions:
1 Parties choose their positions considering the individuals’ sensibility to the issue.
2 Individuals decide upon which party potentially to vote and
mass media blocks decide over reporting in a biased manner or independently.
3 Potential voters get influenced by mass media and decide whether to cast their
votes.
This sequence of actions can be observed in basically each democracy. The suc-
cesses of Tony Blair in Great Britain, Bill Clinton in the United States and the se-
lection of Gerhard Schröder as challenger against the German Chancellor Helmut
Kohl have been regarded as being substantially driven by the ability of those candi-
dates to successfully communicate with mass media or anticipate mass media’s be-
haviour.
Before we go into mathematics section 2.1 will describe the relationship between the
major players of the model and the basic assumptions concerning their behaviour.
32.1 The key-players
The model that we suggest features three major kinds of players: the political par-
ties, mass media blocks, and the individuals (voters and non-voters). There are mu-
tual behavioural dependencies between all of them.
2.1.1 The parties and the voters
We assume that parties are known for traditional positions (records) on the political
spectrum. This is due to the history of the parties which in the model is exogenous.
Further we assume that party leaders do not explicitly want to implement traditional
policies. Their utility is solely determined by the number of votes that they obtain in
elections, i.e. they try to gain as many voters as possible by choosing their platforms.
The individuals’ preferences are supposed to be equally distributed across the politi-
cal spectrum. We assume that they make their electoral decision in two steps: At
first, an individual decides to potentially vote the party with the platform closest to
his position in the policy space (one-peaked party utility). After having made this
decision we call him a potential voter of that party.3 Loyalty with parties in the sense
of the Michigan model of voter behaviour (ENELOW and HINICH 1984: 4 and
CAMPBELL et al. 1960) becomes apparent in those cases where both parties choose
identical positions. Only in those rare cases the potential voters are split into left
wing voters and right wing voters, no matter where on the policy spectrum the par-
ties choose their identical positions. In the second step, the potential voter decides
upon whether to vote. This decision depends on the costs of voting which we as-
sume to be determined by the respective party’s credibility and the electoral pro-
spective of the party platform. Since we are looking at mass elections, individuals
contribute only marginally to the electoral outcome and, therefore, do not want to
                                          
3 Note that the individual is modelled to see the party position as a point on the spectrum which
differs from the models given by ENELOW and HINICH (1981), INGBERMANN (1989), and
ENELOW and MUNGER (1993) who let the individual speculate upon the differences of pre-
electoral party platforms and post-electoral policies. Accordingly the individual perceives party
positions not as points in a policy space but rather as distributions (ENELOW and MUNGER 1993:
758). Our assumption corresponds to the assumption that party leaders do not care about repu-
tation in the first place but try to maximise votes by arbitrarily defining their platform which
makes it useless for individuals to predict the post-electoral behaviour of parties from the pre-
electoral platform. Accordingly, we assume that the individuals’ decisions are based on the pre-
electoral platform.
4pay for information in order to arrive at their decisions in favour of a party (ration-
ally uninformed voters). However, similar to URSPRUNG (1994: 261) we assume that
the individual wants to make a qualified decision once he has arrived at the ballot
box. Therefore, the individuals are supposed to use existing information channels
which do not bear additional information costs such as TV or the daily newsletter.
Credibility in our context is defined as a new interpretation of responsibility in the
DOWNSIAN concept of reputation which declared a party responsible if its policies in
one period are consistent with its actions in the preceding period (DOWNS 1957: 104-
105). In correspondence, we declare a party credible if its current platform is con-
sistent with its record. On the one hand, deviating from the record reduces a party’s
credibility which we interpret as costs of voting. The individual considers these
costs the higher the bigger the sensibility of the individual is towards the issue. On
the other hand, as a party moves towards the median voter position, its chances to
win increase and thus reduces the individual’s cost of voting or increases the bene-
fits of voting respectively. We then assume that a potential voter casts his vote if his
utility (party utility minus costs of voting) has a positive value. We now call him a
voter of the party. Individuals are supposed to have the same intrinsic sensibility to-
wards a policy issue but different sensibilities across issues. Sensibility is supposed
to be high if a decision on an issue is heavily affecting basic needs such as security,
individual freedom, food and energy supply etc. The sensibility-coefficient can be
interpreted as a function of the external costs (BUCHANAN and TULLOCK 1962: 97-
118) related to the decision making on an issue.
The parties have to take non-voters into account when choosing optimal policies.
Hence, there is an indirect mechanism that prevents parties from leaving their tradi-
tional positions arbitrarily.
There are at least two good reasons for making non-voting a feature of electoral
competition models. Firstly, non-voting is an existing phenomenon and secondly it
provides an additional information source that is able to contribute to empirical evi-
dence of party models.
2.1.2 The voters and mass media
We suggest a mutual relationship between mass media and potential voters (indi-
viduals). On the one hand mass media is able to influence the issue-specific percep-
tion of the individuals. They perceive only what media is reporting. On the other
5hand, the individual is consumer of mass media and supposed to consume the me-
dium that hits best the individual’s information demand.
Without media reporting we assume that all individuals have the same intrinsic sen-
sibility towards an issue. However, media blocks are able to report in a biased man-
ner, e.g. by reporting less about the credibility loss of a favoured party and by re-
porting more about the other’s than would correspond to the individuals intrinsic
sensibility. We do not insinuate that media is lying about the distance of deviation
but only vary the intensity of reporting.4 Accordingly, we assume the individuals to
get desensitised towards the first party and over-sensitised towards the other, i.e. for
an issue under consideration, the individuals have party-specific sensibility-
coefficients due to media reporting.
The information requirement of the individuals, however, is supposed to be solely
determined by their intrinsic sensibility. If we interpret the intrinsic sensibility as the
individuals’ demand for a certain frequency in reporting on an issue equal for each
political party, biased reporting is not matching the demand and will be punished by
the market. Nevertheless, by assuming that individuals perceive the average mass
media market mix5 they get influenced by media in the intended way. In conse-
quence, mass media is assumed to be actually able to create a party-specific sensi-
bility by the price of losing market shares or decreasing sales. This effect is sup-
posed to happen a period later. Accordingly, the influential power of mass media is
not directly affected by biased reporting, i.e. it remains constant.
2.1.3 Mass media and the parties
We assume that mass media is not free of political interest. They are supposed to be
traditionally dedicated to one or the other party. In contrast to persuasive campaign-
ing of interest groups which usually are modelled as spending some budget on in-
formation distribution, lobbying etc. mass media is paying with market losses for
biased information distribution. Although the economic interest (market shares) is
strong in mass media’s utility functions we assume that the election result of the fa-
                                          
4
 This corresponds to comments by NANNESTAD and PALDAM (1991: 6) and TULLOCK (1967: 133)
cited in URSPRUNG (1994).
5
 URSPRUNG assumes that the voters check information on parties if they are ‘correct’. Here we
suggest that consuming the average media mix produces average (i.e. ‘checked’) information.
6voured party is also part of it. Accordingly, mass media will try to report on political
issues in a way that balances the influence on election results and the related eco-
nomic losses due to the mismatch of the individuals’ information demands.
It is further assumed that parties are able to communicate with their affiliated media
blocks. They shall have some influence on the political bias of mass media. If com-
munication is successful and deviating from the party record is strategically sup-
ported by a biased mass media campaign, then an election on an issue might be de-
cided in favour of a party even if the situation at the beginning of the election cam-
paign had not been that promising.
2.2 Individuals’ choice
As described above the individual ( I )6 first decides about which party position
[ ]p i A Bi ∈ =0 1; ; ,  potentially to vote and in a second step whether to vote. The first
step is determined by the one-peaked party utility function given in (1) which is
maximal when p Ii = .
(1) ( )u p
p II
p
i
i
=
+ −
1
1
Individuals with ( ) ( )u p u pIp A Ip B>  are potential voters of party A ( VAp ) and vice versa
of party B (VBp ), respectively. The indifferent individual is characterised by
( ) ( )u p u pIp A Ip B= . If the parties choose an identical position in the policy space we
assume that the indifferent individual is the median voter, i.e. the individuals poten-
tially vote according to their latent loyalty (s. above).
The costs of voting are assumed to be defined differently depending on the location
of I  as a potential voter of party A or party B ( I V VAp Bp∈ , ). Under the assumption
p pA B<  we distinguish locations in between the party platforms and locations be-
tween a platform and the edge of the policy space (equation system 4). For the indi-
viduals at the edges of the policy space the position of their party is the more likely
to win the further it is from the edge. The individuals in between the positions see
                                          
6 I  denotes the individual as a person as well as his position on the policy spectrum ( [ ]I ∈ 0 1; ).
7the likelihood of winning increase the closer to the indifferent voter the party posi-
tion is located. For all individuals we assume that the costs of voting ( ( )c pi i,σ ) in-
crease by the square as a party deviates from its record ( pi0 ) moving off the indi-
viduals position, i.e. it is easier to recognise large differences between pi  and pi0
than small ones.
(2a) ( )c p
p p p p p
I V I pA A
A A A A A A
A
p
A,
sgn( ) ( )
;σ
σ
=
+ − − ⋅ ⋅ −
∀ ∈ ∧ ≤1
1 0 0 2
(2b) ( )c p
p p p p p p
I V I pA A
B A A A A A A
A
p
A, ( ) sgn( ) ( )
;σ
σ
=
+ ⋅ − − − ⋅ ⋅ −
∀ ∈ ∧ ≥1
1 12
0 0 2
(2c) ( )c p
p p p p p p
I V I pB B
B A B B B B B
B
p
A, ( ) sgn( ) ( )
;σ
σ
=
+ ⋅ − − − ⋅ ⋅ −
∀ ∈ ∧ ≤1
1 12
0 0 2
(2d) ( )c p
p p p p p
I V I pB B
B B B B B B
B
p
A, ( ) sgn( ) ( )
;σ
σ
=
+ − − − ⋅ ⋅ −
∀ ∈ ∧ ≥1
1 1 0 0 2
The coefficient σi  is a non-negative party-specific measure for the sensibility of in-
dividuals towards the issue under consideration. Without media influence the coeffi-
cient is assumed to have the commonly known value σ I  for all individuals equally.
This coefficient proportionally reflects the importance of a decision on a given issue
to the individuals. Rational behaviour of the parties would imply that they deviate
from their traditional position towards the median voter position (2a and d). If we
assume that potential voters only cast their vote if they have a positive utility uI  of
voting, the number of non-voters Vin  of the rationally behaving party i is determined
as follows:
(3)
( ) ( ) ( )V u p u p c p
V p p V p p
i
n
I i i I
p
i i i
A
n
p p
A A A B
n
p p
B B B
A A B B
⇒ = − ≤
⇔ = ⋅ − = ⋅ −
≥ ≤
, ,
( ) ; ( )
σ σ
σ σ
0
0 0
0 2 0 2
The expression σi i ip p⋅ −( )0 2  will further be referred to as the weighted credibility
loss of party i with the sensibility-coefficient σi  being the weight for the credibility
loss ( )p pi i− 0 2 .
8We will now consider the impact of non-voting on the parties’ policy choice.
2.3 Policy choice of the parties
Party A and B shall try to win the forthcoming elections, one being traditionally lo-
cated on the left policy spectrum and the other on the right. The only goal of the
parties is either maximising votes (first best) or winning the forthcoming election
(second best). Their records [ ]pA0 0 0 5∈ ; ,  on the left policy spectrum  and [ ]pB0 0 5 1∈ , ;
on the right are assumed to be common knowledge. Deviating from these records
lowers the utility of the parties by increasing the number of ‘dissapointed’ potential
voters who do not cast their votes.7 Individuals being part of the voter potential Vi
p
of party i do not cast their votes (non-voters Vin  of party i) if disappointment (costs)
of policy deviation exceeds utility of voting. Accordingly, the number of votes Vi
cast in favour of party i depends on the parties' voter potential, which we assume is
determined by the position [ ]pi ∈ 0 1;  chosen, and the number of non-voters within
this potential being a function of the parties credibility.
(4) ( )
( )
V V V
V p p p p
V
p p
p p
i i
p
i
n
A
A B
A A A
B
A B
B B B
= − ⇒
=
+
− −
= −
+
− −
2
1
2
0 2
0 2
σ
σ
s.t. [ ] [ ]p p p pA B i A B< ≥ ∈ ∈; ; ; , ; , ;σ 0 0 0 5 0 5 10 0
In the equations ( )0 5, ⋅ +p pA B  represents the position of the indifferent voter. Under
the assumption  ,  ,p pA B< ∧ >0 5 0 5  both parties choose their optimal positions:
(5) ∂∂ σ σ
∂
∂
V
p
p p p p with V
p
i
i
A A
A
B B
B
i
i
= ⇒ = + = − ≤0 1
4
1
4
00 0
2
2 ;  .
Accordingly, the location of the optimal position solely depends on a party’s record
and the individuals party-specific sensibility towards the issue (or bundle of issues).
9The positions are the closer to each other the smaller the individuals’ sensibility is,
i.e. compromises are easier to find for issues that are less important for the individu-
als.
Proposition 1
 If the positions of the parties have the same distance to the median
voter, the party with the lower weighted credibility loss wins the election.
 If the parties have the same weighted credibility loss, the position closer
to
the median voter wins the election.
Proof. Be the position of the median voter M = 0 5, . Under the assumption
M p p MA B− = −  it follows according to (4): V VAp Bp= = 0 5, . According to (3) the
number of non-voters equals the weighted credibility loss for each party. According
to (4) we have: V V V V V VAp Bp An Bn A B= ∧ >< ⇒ <> . If p pA B=  then the median
voter is also the indifferent voter (see above). Then both parties have the same voter
potential and the proof holds as well. From M p p M MA B− >< − ∧ = 0 5,  it follows:
p pA B+ <> 1. If in addition we assume σ σA A A B B Bp p p p⋅ − = ⋅ −( ) ( )0 2 0 2  Equation 4
yields V VA B<> . q.e.d.
Proposition 1 basically describes the same conditions for electoral victory as the
probabilistic model in ENELOW and MUNGER (1993). We will now explore under
which conditions the parties’ optimal policy choices according to (5) are winning.
2.4 Equilibrium without mass media influence
Without mass media influence (independent reporting), all individuals have the same
sensibility σ σ σA B I= =  to a given issue. Accordingly, the distance between the tra-
ditional position and the optimal position (Equation 5) is for both parties identical.
For further analyses we will look at different sequences of policy choice. We distin-
guish between the situation where both parties choose their policies simultaneously
                                                                                                                                         
7 Accordingly, candidate motivation in the sense of WITTMANN 1983 and ALESINA 1988 does not
play a role here.
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in uncertainty about each others choice (uncertainty) and situations where one party
chooses first and the position is common knowledge (A-moves-first, B-moves-first).
Proposition 2
 Under independent reporting and  ,  ,p pA B< ∧ >0 5 0 5 , the unique politi-
cal
equilibrium is characterised by p p p pA A B B* * ; = = , where party A (party B)
wins if p pA B0 0 1+ > <( ) .
 If in (i)  ,  ,p pA B≥ ∨ ≤0 5 0 5 , the median voter position M = 0 5,  is either a
winning position or a best response to the other parties policy choice.
Proof of part (i). Given p pA B< , (5) says that  , p pA B  maximise the votes for each
party. These optima are the unique solution if we can show (here: for party A) that
they are still optimal under p pA B=  and p pA B> . With  ,pB > 0 5  we are able to find
′ <p pA B  with ( ) ( )V p p V p pAp A B Ap A B′ > = =,  , 0 5 . From ′ − < −p p p pA A B A0 0 , follows ac-
cording to (4) ( ) ( )V p p V p pA A B A A B′ > =,   . With (5) ′ <p pA B  is optimal, if
′ = + =p p pA A I A
0 1 4σ  . If ′′ >p pA B , party A is the right wing party, i.e. votes are cal-
culated like VB  in (4). With  ,pB > 0 5 , V p p p p V p pAp A B A B Ap A B( ,  ) , (  ) , ( ,  )′′ = − ⋅ ′′ + < < ′1 0 5 0 5
results. As ′′ − > ′ −p p p pA A A A
0 0
, we have ( ) ( ) ( )V p p V p p V p pA A B A A B A A B′′ < ′ ≤,  ,   ,  . Hence,
pA  is the best response to pB . Since we have a symmetric problem the opposite
holds as well. This equilibrium is unique for p pA B< , since the optimal positions do
not depend on each other. Solutions with p pA B=  can only be a best response if the
parties have not an incentive to move to  p pA B< . For party B this would be the case
if p p pA B B= >   or p p pA B B> >  . In both cases, party A would be better off choosing
pA  (see above). The same is true vice versa. Accordingly, p p p pA A B B* * ; = =  is a
unique equilibrium. Substituting (5) in (4) yields ( )V p p p pA A B A B I ,  , ( )= ⋅ + −0 5 1 160 0 σ
and ( )V p p p pB A B A B I ,  , ( )= − ⋅ + −1 0 5 1 160 0 σ . From p pA B0 0 1+ > <( )  directly follows
( ) ( )V p p V p pA A B B A B ,  ( )  , > < . q.e.d.
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Proof of part (ii). For the proof of part (ii) we distinguish between three cases de-
scribing all possible situations if  ,pB ≤ 0 5 :  ,  p p pB B A< ∧ ≥0 5  (case 1),
 ,   ,p p pB B A< ∧ ≤ <0 5 0 5  (case 2),  , , p pB A< ∧ ≥0 5 0 5  (case 3). In case 1, party A might
improve its situation by choosing p pA B=   or p pA B= + , where the latter is the optimal
position for party A changing from a left wing party position to a right wing party
position which in the optimum is marginally larger than pB . The condition for
party A to select p pA B= +  is:
(6) 1 0 5 0 50 2 0 2− ⋅ + − ⋅ − ≥ ⋅ + − ⋅ −+ +, ( ) ( ) , (  ) (  )p p p p p p p pB B I B A A B I A Aσ σ
If we set the difference between pB  and pB+  to zero and use optimal party position
according to (5) we find the following condition under which party A selects pB+ :
(7) p p pB A
I I A
I
*
,1 2
0
03 8 16 32
4
= −
± + −σ σ
σ
,
where only the larger solution is of interest here. Now we will analyse if party A has
an incentive to select pB+  if pB = 0 5, , i.e.:
(8) 0 5 3 8 16 32
4
0 5 1
4
0 50
0
0
, ,  ,= −
− + −
⇒ = − ⇒ =p
p
p pA
I I A
I
A
I
A
σ σ
σ σ
However,  ,pA = 0 5  is a contradiction to the definition of case 1. If party A chooses
p pA B=  we find the same result. Hence, party A is better off remaining at pA , if
party B chooses pB = 0 5, . In that case V VB
p
A
p>  and V VBn A
n< . Thus, pB = 0 5,  wins.
The proof holds as well in case 2. In case 3, 5,0=M  is a Nash-equilibrium for both
parties. Each party, leaving the position would loose potential voters with a marginal
rate of 0,5. Since both parties have not yet reached the optimal position according to
(5), the marginal reduction in non-voters is smaller than 0,5. Thus, there is no incen-
tive to leave this position given the other party has chosen 5,0=M , i.e. it is a best
response to the other party’s strategy. Since we are looking at symmetrical prob-
lems, the proof holds as well for  ,pA ≥ 0 5 . q.e.d
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The rational choice according to (7) is the risk avers8 second best choice for party B
under the information modes uncertainty and B-moves-first. If party A could be
forced to move first (A-moves-first) it would choose pA . In this case party B could
choose the first best solution pB  which would be more efficient for party B. Ac-
cordingly, party B has an incentive in case 1 to hold its party conference where the
platform is fixed as close to the elections as possible. In case 2 it would be fatal for
party B to choose is optimal policy according to (5). The voter potential would be
heavily reduced due to changing from a right wing party to a left wing party. As first
mover, party B would select its position according to (7). As first mover and under
the assumption of risk avers parties, party A would choose pA . In that case party B,
now as the second mover, could choose pA+  as optimal policy with a better election
result as in the first-mover situation. The policy choices of risk avers parties under
different sequence-modes are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Policy choice without media influence under different information modes
Information Modus
Policy Constellations
uncertainty A-moves-first B-moves-first
 ,  p p pB B A< ∧ ≥0 5 p p p pA A B B
* * ; = = p p p pA A B B
* * ; = = p p p pA A B A
* * ; = = ++
 ,   ,p p pB B A< ∧ ≤ <0 5 0 5 p p p pA A B A
* * ; = = ++ p p p pA A B A
* * ; = = + p p p pA A B A
* * ; = = ++
 , , p pB A< ∧ ≥0 5 0 5 p pA B
* *
, ; ,= =0 5 0 5 p pA B* *, ; ,= =0 5 0 5 p pA B* *, ; ,= =0 5 0 5
 ,  p p pA A B> ∧ ≤0 5 p p p pA A B B
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I I A
I
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= +
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03 8 16 32
4
σ σ
σ
 p pA A
+
= + ε  p pB B
−
= − ε 9
                                          
8 That means they prefer the second best winning position even if a position existed that might
result in more votes, however, by the risk of being pushed to the unfavourable part of the spec-
trum and losing the election.
9
 ε  symbolises a infinitesimal small distance.
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Proposition 2 and the results given in Table 1 lead to the following interpretations:
• In the model suggested here, a party is in a favourable pre-electoral position if its
traditional policy is closer to the median voter than that of its opponent.
• If only one party is able to leave its traditional position to its optimal policy be-
yond the median voter position the other party can improve its (losing) election
result by holding its party conference after the favoured party (second mover ad-
vantage).
• If both parties are able to choose an optimal policy beyond the median voter posi-
tion, they both select the median voter position as best strategies.
Under independent reporting the winner of an election is basically determined by his
record. In the following section we assume that mass media is able to alter the indi-
viduals’ sensibility by reporting in a biased manner.
3 The Influence of Mass Media
In this study we assume that mass media can either report independently or in a bi-
ased manner. Initially, media landscape is assumed to be equally devised between
devotion to either party A (mass media block A) or party B (mass media block B).
The control variable of mass media is the sensibility-coefficient introduced above. In
an ideal world where voters would be able to get any required information they
would like the intensity of reporting correspond with their sensibility σ I  towards a
given issue. In real world, however, voters basically receive information via mass
media. Hence, we assume that a bias in reporting is able to increase or decrease vot-
ers sensibility towards an issue in a party-specific manner. E.g. if party A deviated
as far from its traditional position as party B ( p p p pA A B B− = −0 0 ) and mass media
reported on party B’s deviation more intensively than on party A’s, we would assume
the number of non-voters of party B being bigger than that of party A ( V VBn An> ). In
that case mass media had managed to alter the intrinsic sensibility σ I  into the party-
specific perceived sensibility σ A  and σ B  with σ σA B< .
Further we assume biased reporting to be restricted through mass media market. If
potential voters as consumers of mass media do not get the information (reporting
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intensity) that they require (σ σ σA B I, ≠ ), we assume them to lose interest in that
medium, i.e. the demand for the medium is reduced. We assume that this market ef-
fect occurs after the election, i.e. the influential power (market share) of a medium is
not affected immediately when the reporting bias happens.10 Accordingly, we pro-
pose the following utility functions for the mass media blocks a and b (MBA and
MBB):
(9)
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
u
u
MBA B A
MBA
A
I MBA
B
I
MBB A B
MBB
A
I MBB
B
I
= ⋅ − − − ⋅
−
−
−






∈
= ⋅ − − − ⋅
−
−
−






∈
α σ σ α
σ σ σ σ
α
β σ σ β
σ σ σ σ
β
( ) ; ;
( ) ; ;
1
2 2
0 1
1
2 2
0 1
2 2
2 2
In (9) α and β are measures for the political bias of the media blocks and σ MBij  is the
reporting bias of media block i towards party j. The first term represents the utility
stemming from the party result. The second term represents the economically driven
utility loss. We assume that the mass media market is punishing with more power
than the political market is able to reward. Therefore, the second part of (9) reduces
media utility by the square of reporting bias. In the independent case, only the sec-
ond part of the utility function would be optimised. The maximum value is zero in
the case of σ σMBi
j
I= , i.e. in the optimum the independent media block is reporting
what is required by the consumer.
3.1 Optimal reporting
Assuming equal weight11 of MBA and MBB in the media market, the sensibility to-
wards party A and party B is determined according to Equation 10.
(10) σ σ σ σ σ σA MBA
A
MBB
A
B
MBA
B
MBB
B
=
+
=
+
2 2
;
                                          
10 Repeating the game has to take care of effects on market shares.
11 That means that the losses in market share do not have an effect on the market shares in this
period. However, the utility functions of mass media already anticipate effects on their sales.
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Substituting (10) into (9) and differentiating to MBi’s control variables yields:
(11) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
∂
∂σ
σ σ
α
α
∂
∂σ
σ σ
α
α
∂
∂σ
σ σ
β
β
∂
∂σ
σ σ
β
β
u u
u u
MBA
MBA
a MBA
A
I
MBA
MBA
B MBA
B
I
MBB
MBB
A MBB
A
I
MBB
MBB
B MBB
B
I
= ⇒ = −
−
= ⇒ = +
−
= ⇒ = +
−
= ⇒ = −
−
0
2 1
0
2 1
0
2 1
0
2 1
 ; 
 ; 
Since sensibility has a non-negative value, σ MBAA  and σ MBBB  are supposed to have no
further effect on the related party result if ( )α β σ σ, > +2 2 1I I . We will further as-
sume the media blocks to respect these restrictions.12
3.2 Equilibrium in media reporting
We distinguish between two information levels concerning the relationship between
parties and mass media. In the first case parties make their policy choice regardless
of what media is reporting about it (IL1). In the second case we assume that parties
are able to correctly anticipate media influence (IL2). The "media game" is charac-
terised by two strategies for each media block: reporting independently or reporting
with optimal bias.
Proposition 3
In the media game described above we find the Nash-equilibrium (NE) conditions:
 NE in independent media reporting only occurs if α β= = 0  (NEI).
 NE in favour of party A exists, if β α
α
<
+
2
1
 (case a) and
NE in favour of  party B exists, if α ββ< +1  (case b)
                                          
12 That means the result of the affiliated party can not be further improved but the result of the
opposing party could still be lowered. However, we assume media not to be that unfair.
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 The NE of (ii) is unique, if in case a β α
α
<
−2
 (NEA) and in case b
α
β
β< −2
(NEB).
The proof of (i) and (ii) follows straight forward from solving the 2x2-game matrix
describing the media game above (Table 2).
Part (iii),(a) follows from the logical conditions Part (ii),(a) AND NOT Part (ii),(b).
Part (iii),(b) follows from the logical condition Part(ii),(b) AND NOT Part (ii),(a).
A Nash-equilibrium for both media blocks reporting in a biased manner would fol-
low from α β= = 1. However, these values of α and β were excluded above.
Table 2: The game matrix of the mass media game
MBA = independent
(α = 0)
MBA = biased
( 0 2
2 1
< ≤
+
α
σ
σ
I
I
)
MBB = independent
(β = 0 )
uMBA = 0
uMBB = 0
uMBA =
⋅ −
α
α
2
4 1( )
uMBB = 0
MBB = biased
( 0 2
2 1
< ≤
+
β σ
σ
I
I
)
uMBA = 0
uMBB =
⋅ −
β
β
2
4 1( )
uMBA =
⋅ −
−
⋅
⋅ −
α
α
α β
β
2
4 1 2 1( ) ( )
uMBB =
⋅ −
−
⋅
⋅ −
β
β
α β
α
2
4 1 2 1( ) ( )
3.3 Impacts on policy choice
If we consider the Nash-equilibria in reporting we find the following distribution of
perceived voter sensibilities according to the three unique cases of Proposition 3:
(12a) σ σ σA B I= =  (NEI)
17
(12b) ( ) ( )σ σ
α
α
σ σ σ
α
α
σA I I B I I= −
−
≥ = +
−
≤
4 1
1
2 4 1
3
2
;  (NEA)
(12c) ( ) ( )σ σ
β
β σ σ σ
β
β σA I I B I I= + − ≤ = − − ≥4 1
3
2 4 1
1
2
;  (NEB)
(12a) describes exactly the situation of Chapter 2. (12b and c) give room for further
interpretations depending on the information level between parties and media
blocks. The boundaries follow from the comment to (11).
1 Under IL1 media blocks try to mobilise the non-voters of their favoured party
and demoralise the voters of the other party by reporting in a biased manner under
given voter potential.
2 Under IL2 it is possible for a party to enlarge its voter potential towards its "non-
traditional" policy area by anticipating a favourable media reporting bias.
In general, we expect the second possibility to be more efficient than the first, due to
the existence of a larger information quantity.
4 Making winners out of losers
Since we want to give an answer to the question if and under which conditions mass
media is able to have decisive influence on electoral outcome, we will now analyse
under which conditions a potential loser of an election can be made a winner.
4.1 No anticipation of media reporting in policy choice
Under IL1 we assume that the parties act as described in Chapter 2. In respect to
policy choice we do not get any new aspects due to media influence. However, we
are able to introduce new restrictions to mass media bias if we assume that media
blocks act in an opportunistic way. That means reporting in a biased manner is only
worthwhile when the favoured party is able to win the forthcoming election or when
the danger of losing an election exists. We now try to find combinations of tradi-
tional positions which do not give any incentive for biased reporting.
Proposition 4
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Under IL1 opportunistic media blocks have an incentive to report in a biased man-
ner only if:
(13) 1 1
16
1 1
16
0 0
− ≤ + ≤ +
σ σI
A B
I
p p .
Combinations smaller (bigger) than the given interval do not leave a chance for
party A (B) to win.
Proof. Under IL1 the parties choose ( ) ( ) ; p p p pA I A I B I B Iσ σ σ σ= + = −0 01 4 1 4 . The
most favourable situation for party A now would be NEA. In this situation party A
would win if the following condition is satisfied:
(14) p p p pA B I
I
A B I
I
0 0
2
0 0
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4 1
16
1
2
4 1
16
+
−
−
⋅ −
⋅
≥ −
+
−
+
⋅ −
⋅
σ α α
σ
σ α α
σ
( ) ( )
The left part of (13) follows straightforward from using the boundaries σ σA I≥ 2
and σ σB I≤ 3 2  given in (12b). The right part follows from the analogous procedure
for party B under NEB. q.e.d.
According to the proposition, a loser situation in traditional positions (s. Proposi-
tion 2(i)) can be turned into an electoral victory by mass media. However, the power
of media shrinks with increasing intrinsic voter sensibility. On the other hand, very
low voter sensibility (σ I ≤ 1 16) gives media the power to turn every combination of
traditional positions into an electoral success.
4.2 Parties anticipate media behaviour correctly
If we use the boundaries given in (12b and c) and assume that parties are able to an-
ticipate the related Nash-equilibrium situations we can formulate a condition for
media bias similar to Proposition 4.
Proposition 5
Under IL2 opportunistic media blocks have an incentive to report in a biased man-
ner only if:
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(15) 1 1
4
1 1
4
0 0
− ≤ + ≤ +
σ σI
A B
I
p p .
Proof. If the parties correctly anticipate NEA, they optimally choose:
(16) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ;  ( ( ))p NE p p NE pA
A
A
I
B
A
B
I
= +
⋅ −
⋅ −
= −
⋅ +
⋅ −
0 01
4 4 1
1
4 4 1σ
α
α σ
α
α
.
Substituting (16) into (4) and formulating the condition ( )( ) ( )( )V p NE V p NEA A A B B A ≥
analogously to (14); with the boundaries of (12b) we obtain the left part of (15). The
right part follows from the analogous solution for party B, NEB and using the
boundaries in (12c). q.e.d.
The difference in the intervals of Proposition 4 and 5 can be interpreted as efficiency
gains or as the speculative gains for the parties due to successful communication
with mass media. However, there is a risk which occurs if a party speculates on a
favourable Nash-equilibrium (NEA or NEB) and the affiliated media block is not able
to increase its political bias as required according to Proposition 3 or the party
speculated wrong on the bias respectively. In that case, the broadening of the voter
potential by deviating more from the traditional position is overcompensated by the
number of non-voters who do not consider the party credible anymore.13
4.3 Stackelberg strategies
The propositions above indicate that a party i whose traditional position is relatively
far from the median voter position is still able to win an election if mass media re-
ports in NEi and party i anticipates the situation. Therefore, it is necessary that the
political bias of the affiliated media block MBi exceeds a certain level while the bias
of the competing media block (MBj) has to stay below a certain level. This is possi-
ble if party i and its affiliated media block convince their opponents that mass media
market barriers would not hinder them to achieve NEi before policy choices are
made (Stackelberg-leader). A winning strategy of party i could look like this:
                                          
13 Note that Proposition 5 only considers the case that the parties correctly anticipate the media
equilibrium. If one party speculated wrong, the winning chances of the other would be im-
proved and the interval in the proposition would be even larger.
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• Party i has to commit itself to a platform beyond the "σI-optimum" in order to
signalise MBi that it really wants to win the election and it is worthwhile mobi-
lising the political forces of MBi.
• The opposing party (j) has to be convinced that party i will have extreme difficul-
ties to win the election in order to keep political bias of MBj low.
 The opponents of party i could try to ensure a victory with the following strategy:
• The opposing media block MBj launches some politically biased reports before
party i holds its party conference to signalise a strong political bias which makes
NEi seem unrealistic.
No matter which of the strategies sketched above is considered, the precondition for
its success is a positive relationship between a party and the related media block. For
Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder this obviously has been the case
which gives some empirical evidence to the model suggested in this study.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The model proposed in this study indicates that it is possible for mass media to de-
cide upon the winner of elections. The preconditions for winning out of an unfa-
vourable starting position are:
1 The starting position based on the parties traditional positions has to be located
within a certain interval of the political spectrum which leaves a possibility for
mass media to turn that situation into a victory. We found that in a two party
model this is not the case for extreme positions or issues with high sensibilities to
the individuals. Hence, an extreme political position is not able to win against a
moderate position even if half of mass media is almost totally neglecting its eco-
nomic grounds in favour of extreme political propaganda.14
2 A favourable Nash-equilibrium in mass media reporting has to exist, i.e. the party
with the worse starting position has to convince its affiliated mass media repre-
                                          
14 Extreme political positions might become relevant if substantial amounts of money are spent on
non-market driven and non-excludable persuasion channels (e.g. advertisement pillars).
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sentatives to report in a more politically biased manner than the competitors on
the mass media market even on the risk of losing market shares.
3 The media block affiliated with the favourite of the election can not be convinced
to increase its political bias to a level sufficient to prevent an unfavourable equi-
librium in reporting against the favoured party.
Even if some of these conclusions sound like being empirically rational it is impor-
tant for future work to obtain empirical values for the sensibility-coefficient and to
test the model on the basis of existing political decision making processes.
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